to give better effect to the unusually close legal relations that the two countries have always enjoyed, and which have deepened under CER. 13 The treaty will see New Zealand incorporated, with a few adjustments, into the civil jurisdiction and judgments scheme that sorts litigation between federal and state courts in the Australian federation. Legislation to implement the treaty has not yet appeared, and there may be some refinement of the scheme in the course of its drafting. 14 It is therefore quite possible that Australia and New Zealand will soon ratify and implement another double convention -the Choice of Court Conventionwhich provides for somewhat different means of dealing with jurisdiction and judgments. As the Trans-Tasman regime will deal comprehensively with the allocation of general civil jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in the CER market area, it will certainly include litigation of the kind that is to be captured by the Choice of Court Convention. This raises the two issues that I discuss in this article. First, there are profound differences between the two models -differences in the approach to the exercise of jurisdiction and in the ease by which judgments would be enforced transnationally. Indeed, these differences are more deeply seated than any between the Choice of Court Convention and the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention. The particular features of the Trans-Tasman regime for jurisdiction and judgments are therefore identified and developed. A comparison between the different approaches of the Choice of Court Convention and the Trans-Tasman regime is then drawn. Secondly, the Choice of Court Convention deals explicitly with its relationship with other international instruments on jurisdiction and judgments. How these provisionsespecially Article 26 -would affect the simultaneous operation of the Convention and the Trans-Tasman regime will be briefly discussed. This leads to some reflections on whether the Convention requires some rethinking of the arrangements made under the Trans-Tasman Treaty.
B. THE TRANS-TASMAN MODEL FOR JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS

Trans-Tasman Judgments Enforcement
Australia and New Zealand have a shared history stemming from the European settlements of the countries as British colonies (and in the case of Australia, six of them) through the late 18th and 19th centuries. This shared history saw occasional co-operation between them, and efforts at improving the enforcement of judgments across "The Ditch" 15 -the colloquial term for the Tasman Sea which separates the Australian continent and the islands of New Zealand. From the mid-1930s, the Australian states and New Zealand adopted legislation based on the United Kingdom's Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 which, despite its name, was principally a means for improving the reciprocal enforcement of judgments made by superior courts in the British Empire and Commonwealth. 16 The imperial scheme is one of "indirect jurisdiction", allowing judgment debtors, at the point of registration in the country where enforcement is sought, to challenge the jurisdiction of the original court to make the judgment. However, the present arrangements between Australia and New Zealand sit inside the trading, co-operative and legal rubric of the CER Trade Agreement. 17 The CER Treaty has created perhaps the world's most open free trade area and, reinforced by the free movement of people across the Tasman, has brought unparalleled economic, social and legal integration to the two countries.
In 1988, during a review of the CER, attention was given to the place that closer legal relations should have in assisting the integration of the Trans-Tasman market area. A subsequent Memorandum of Understanding on Harmonisation of Business Laws signed at Darwin that year promised the "further recognition and reciprocal enforcement of court decisions in each country, including enforcement of injunctions, orders for specific performance and revenue judgments". 18 The result was disappointing, and inexplicable. In Australia, it secured a federal takeover of the law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments by registration, which before then had been carried by the states and territories. 19 It added little else to the existing ability to enforce New Zealand judgments in Australia, apart from enabling judgments of the New Zealand District Court (an inferior court) to be registered in all parts of the country. However, the legislation in both countries retained the basic structure of the imperial scheme of 1933, 20 and as a result added nothing more to improve the enforcement of judgments in trading and commercial relationships. It retained the imperial scheme's permission to test indirectly, at the point of registration, the jurisdiction of the original court to give judgment in the first place. The registration of non-money judgments, despite the aspirations of the Darwin Understanding, was unrealised, and remains unrealised. 21 And as the two countries have taken care to maintain the CER as an economic arrangement and studiously avoid any suggestion of political integration, it is strange that the only substantial improvement in the efficiency of the enforcement of judgments across the Tasman that came as a result of the Darwin Understanding was that each country could extend its political sovereignty into the other. 22 Express provision was made for the registration of revenue judgments and competition judgments, and in both cases (and only in those two cases) any right to challenge to the rendering court's jurisdiction to make the judgment was denied. 23 There is little wonder that in 2006 the Trans-Tasman Working Group recommended "further reform to create a coherent legal framework for resolving civil disputes with a Trans-Tasman element", and opted to do this by the double convention model that "was designed to remove many similar problems between the Australian States and Territories". 24
The Australian Model
In one sense, it is misleading to describe the Australian arrangements for the allocation of jurisdiction between courts in the federation and for the enforcement of judgments across state borders as a "model". This might suggest that it was consciously designed. In truth, the simple lines of the Australian federal scheme owe as much to accident, good fortune and judicial reinterpretation (long after its central legislative structures were introduced) as they do to careful planning. However, with the unparalleled importance they give to the principles of the House of Lords' decision in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, 25 they probably represent the purest presentation of a common law model for a double convention that is presently available.
In short, the Australian model provides for the absolutely free circulation of any judgment made in any federal, state or territory court or tribunal anywhere in the Australian federation. It is a "double convention" because there are, with one important hitch, common principles of jurisdiction that help to sort litiga-tion between courts across the federation. Proceedings will be heard in the forum conveniens, as determined by the exercise of judicial discretion. The hitch is for the federal courts, which can only hear matters within federal jurisdiction and which therefore, unlike state and territory courts, have a jurisdiction delimited by rules as well as by the principles of forum conveniens. 26 In Australia, the interstate enforcement of state court judgments is governed by the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). This perpetuates arrangements that have been in place since 1902, 27 by which interstate judgments are localised by registration in the state where enforcement is sought. 28 There is no restriction on the kind of judgment that can be enforced interstate: the Australian model allows enforcement of money judgments and non-money judgments of any kind. 29 It also denies any place to traditional common law defences to the enforcement of foreign judgments when securing interstate registration and enforcement 30 (although this is also thought to be an implication of the Australian Constitution's requirement that states give full faith and credit to judgments made in sister-states). 31 It makes no provision for the treatment of incompatible judgments. The Act of 1992 eases enforcement further by allowing registration to take place by faxing a copy of the judgment to the appropriate court registry in the state where enforcement is sought. 32 This scheme effectively gives all state and territory courts an inexpensive, efficient and unchallengeable jurisdiction to enforce their judgments anywhere in the federation.
The principles of jurisdiction are more complicated. The Australian scheme originally based the long-arm jurisdiction of state courts within the federation on the rule-based model of the English Supreme Court Rules, 33 and required some defined nexus between the subject-matter of the claim and the state to be established if a defendant was to be served interstate. 34 However, the innovation of the Act of 1992 was completely to abandon rule-based jurisdictions within Australia, and enable the unfettered circulation of the civil process of state and territory courts throughout the nation. A writ from any state or territory court can be served anywhere in the federation, and establishes the court's jurisdiction as of right. 35 That court, though, is only to exercise the jurisdiction if it is the forum conveniens. If it concludes that it is not the forum conveniens, it has discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Australian court that is the forum conveniens.
Significantly, for allocating jurisdiction between different Australian courts, the forum conveniens is identified by the principles set out by the House of Lords in Spiliada. 36 It is the court "which prima facie is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action". 37 This is despite the fact that, in international litigation, the High Court of Australia has consistently rejected the use of Spiliada. 38 In Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd, 39 the High Court concluded that proceedings could only be stayed or dismissed if it appeared to the court that it was itself "a clearly inappropriate forum" for dealing with the dispute. 40 The Voth standard has given Australian courts the most forum-centric approach to international jurisdiction in the common law world. 41 It is possible to conclude that, in the foreign country, there may be a clearly more appropriate court that could deal with the litigation without making the Australian court "a clearly inappropriate forum". 42 The recognition that this raises the possibility of parallel litigation also makes the approach conceptually unsuitable as a means of sorting jurisdiction in a way that identifies the best placed court to deal with the litigation. As is discussed later, its application to choice-of-court agreements remains unresolved. 43 Australian courts have only occasionally assumed that the Voth enquiry directly absorbs the question of how to deal with choice-of-court agreements, 44 but even when they do not use Voth in decisions about choice-of-court agreements, it is evident that Australian courts still approach them with a Voth-induced preference for keeping international litigation to themselves. For superior courts in Australia -the State and Territory Supreme Courts, the Federal Court, the Family Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia -the question of forum conveniens arises in considering whether the proceedings should be transferred to another superior court. Momentarily putting the "hitch" with federal courts to one side, in 1987 uniform federal, state and territory legislation invested the subject-matter jurisdiction of each of these courts in all of the others. With minor qualifications, 45 this gave each superior court the power to deal with any matter that any other superior court could. 46 Any proceeding could begin in any of these courts, and if a transfer was made to another superior court, that court would have an undoubted subject-matter jurisdiction to deal with it.
It is sufficient for a transfer to be ordered that it is in the "interests of justice" to do so. 47 From an early point, some courts understood this as enacting the Spiliada formula of declining jurisdiction, so that a transfer would be made to the superior court which was the clearly more appropriate forum for dealing with the litigation. The High Court confirmed that reading of the legislation in BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz, 48 elevating the Spiliada approach to the point where, within the Australian federation, but unlike its position in England, 49 it is the sole determinant of the proper exercise of jurisdiction.
A similar situation arises for the inferior courts -the local, magistrates, district and county courts in each state and territory. Unlike the superior courts, they cannot directly transfer proceedings to another court. Under the Service and Execution of Process Act, inferior courts can nevertheless grant a stay of the proceedings before them, 50 and grant that stay on condition that the action be pursued in another court. 51 The Act expressly provides that the stay may be granted if a court in another state or territory "is the appropriate court to determine" the proceedings. 52 Inferior courts have been granting stays of this kind by reference to the Spiliada formula that the interstate court is "the more appropriate court". 53 
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The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area and the Choice of Court Convention Vol. The exception to this simple approach to the allocation of jurisdiction comes with the federal courts. This is a matter of some significance for the TransTasman arrangements, as the Federal Court of Australia aspires to be a centre for commercial and corporate litigation in the Asia-Pacific, 54 but, of all of the Australasian superior courts, it has the most limited jurisdiction in general contract and tort claims. The Federal Court's capacity to deal with commercial litigation expanded considerably when it was a full participant in the scheme that saw all superior court jurisdictions pooled, and which therefore purported to allow it to exercise the state and territory Supreme Courts' jurisdiction in general commercial, contract and tort claims. However, in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally 55 in 1999 it was held to be unconstitutional for the federal courts to exercise state or territory jurisdictions granted by state or territory legislation. As a result, the Federal Court may only hear claims in contract and tort that "accrue" to some other action based on a federal statute -normally the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Federal courts can therefore only exercise a federal jurisdiction (including an "accrued jurisdiction"), while, in contrast, the state courts can exercise both state and federal jurisdictions. So, the jurisdiction of the Victorian Supreme Court in an intra-Australian matter (and whether a federal or state question) is determined purely by Spiliada principles of forum conveniens. But for the Federal Court to hear any matter, first, the question must be within the rules that define the limits of the court's federal jurisdiction, and, second, the Federal Court must be the most appropriate Australian court to deal with it. Although the rules defining federal accrued jurisdiction are both vague and uncertain, they are nevertheless taken to be rules, and compromise the otherwise complete reliance on discretionary principles to allocate jurisdiction within Australia. 56 The Federal Court's limited commercial jurisdiction was not considered in the negotiations and reports leading to the Trans-Tasman Treaty, but it could have implications for the effectiveness of some of the treaty's legal machinery.
The Proposed Trans-Tasman Regime
Reporting in late 2006, the Trans-Tasman Working Group recommended that a treaty on jurisdiction and judgments should extend the present Australian model to New Zealand. 57 In doing so it rejected a rule-based approach to establishing agreed civil jurisdictions along the lines of the Brussels Regulation. 58 The Austra-lian model, which I suggest is the archetypal common law double convention, was thought to more suitable for countries "which share a common law heritage and very similar justice systems". 59 Furthermore, "because of the confidence that both countries have in each other's judicial and regulatory institutions, many of the safeguards required for interaction with more distant, dissimilar countries are unnecessary." 60 As a consequence, the Trans-Tasman Treaty that followed will create a genuine Trans-Tasman Judicial Area -resting on an underlying "uniform writ stretching from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to the Chathams". 61 This is also arguably the world's most liberal scheme for the transnational enforcement of judgments, tied to agreed principles of jurisdiction that centre on the court that is, in the CER market area, the forum conveniens. The Australian model is therefore to be extended to include New Zealand with only the smallest qualifications. Initiating process in any personal action that is issued by any Australian court -whether a federal, state or territory court -will be able to be served (without leave) in New Zealand, and the civil process of any New Zealand court will be able to be served (without leave) anywhere in Australia. 62 The same will also be possible for the process of some tribunals. 63 Any Australian or New Zealand court would therefore have the right to hear any matter (within the existing subject-matter and financial restrictions on its jurisdiction) in which a defendant could be served in either country. From that point, the court will decline jurisdiction by granting a stay of proceedings if there is another court in the other country that is the more appropriate to deal with the case. 64 A choice-of-court agreement is treated as one consideration to take into account when deciding which court is the forum conveniens. 65 This represents a larger change for Australian courts which, at present, must use the more myopic Voth principles of jurisdiction when New Zealand courts might have some claim on the same proceedings. 66 New Zealand courts already use the Spiliada approach when assessing whether they or Australian courts are to deal with the litigation. 67 There would be no means other than deciding whether to stay proceedings on the ground of forum conveniens for placing them in the most appropriate court within the Trans-Tasman area. Anti-suit injunctions between Australian and New Zealand courts are to be banned. 68 The agreement on common principles of jurisdiction centring on the forum conveniens will allow the enforcement of any civil judgment made in Australia or New Zealand by registration in a comparable court in the other country, and registration will give it the same effect as a judgment of the registering court. 69 This will extend to non-money judgments; 70 injunctions and orders for specific performance are expressly mentioned in the Working Group's report. 71 The judgment debtor could raise only one defence to registration: that enforcement would be contrary to public policy. 72 Any other issue traditionally raised in proceedings for resisting the enforcement of foreign judgments, such as fraud or a denial of natural justice, cannot be used to challenge enforcement, and will have to be raised with the court that rendered the original judgment. 73 The Trans-Tasman Treaty does not provide for a regime that replicates the existing Australian model in precisely all details. The regime therefore loses some of the efficiency of the Australian model and, from the perspective of Australian courts, brings some imbalance into the model. 74 Furthermore, the proposed Trans-Tasman regime also replicates a weakness of the Australian model -its silence on the treatment of incompatible judgments.
First, the allocation of jurisdiction between the superior Australian courts uses the mechanism of a transfer of proceedings to the more appropriate court. In part, this is made possible by the legislative pooling of much of these courts'
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Journal of Private International Law 223 subject-matter jurisdictions among themselves. 75 The transfer procedure enables proceedings to be picked up in "the transferee court" at the point they reached in the "transferor" court, and so litigants do not have to retrace any of the pre-trial procedural steps they took before the transfer was ordered. The treaty does not provide for a pooling of the subject-matter jurisdictions of Australian and New Zealand courts, 76 and without this a transfer between the two countries' courts is problematic. A stay of proceedings must be used. Accordingly, if the Supreme Court of New South Wales (NSW) considered the New Zealand High Court to be the more appropriate for hearing litigation, it would be required to stay the proceedings (although probably only on condition that they be conducted in New Zealand) and they would have to recommence, from scratch, in New Zealand. In similar proceedings in NSW that favoured the Supreme Court of Tasmania as the more appropriate court for the hearing, the NSW court would (as at present) transfer the proceedings to Tasmania without any loss of pre-trial effort or expense on the part of the litigants. Secondly, the Australian federal scheme incorporates all Australian courts and tribunals. The treaty does not provide for this, but rather that subordinate legislation in each country is allowed to add tribunals to the Trans-Tasman arrangements on an ad hoc basis. 77 Thirdly, the Australian federal scheme includes orders made in proceedings in rem, 78 whereas proceedings in rem have been excluded from the Trans-Tasman regime. 79 Fourthly, in Australia it is still technically possible for superior courts to issue anti-suit injunctions against each other, 80 but Article 8(5) of the Treaty bans the issue of anti-suit injunctions against proceedings across the Tasman. In this respect, the treaty reflects the arrangements under the Brussels Regulation more than it does the Australian model. 81 This could nevertheless lead to difficulties that themselves suggest it is preferable to retain the availability of anti-suit injunctions in Trans-Tasman cases -although these difficulties should not be exaggerated. 82 The anti-suit injunction is the natural corollary to the mechanism 224 The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area and the Choice of Court Convention Vol. 82 The Trans-Tasman Working Group also did not address the possibility that it could be constitutionally difficult in Australia to restrict the armoury available to federal courts for protecting the of stays in favour of the forum conveniens, on which the exercise of Trans-Tasman jurisdiction is to depend exclusively. With other precautionary constraints, it formally allows proceedings brought in another court that is a forum non conveniens to be restrained. Despite being, with the stay and transfer of proceedings, one legal mechanism by which proceedings can be confined to the forum conveniens, the Working Group recommended that the anti-suit injunction be banned for litigation that had claims on both Australian and New Zealand courts so that it not be "used to circumvent the proposed trans-Tasman regime, including the provisions on staying the proceedings on the ground that another court is the more appropriate forum". 83 It is not entirely clear how, if properly used, an anti-suit injunction would circumvent the principle of forum conveniens at the centre of Trans-Tasman jurisdiction. Indeed, exclusive reliance on one discretionary mechanism, like a stay of proceedings, to place litigation in the forum conveniens risks both lis pendens and the possibility that incompatible judgments could arise within the market area. This suggests that a second, more aggressive measure, like the anti-suit injunction, might be needed to end any stalemate between Australian and New Zealand courts. It would nevertheless do so without any conceptual compromise of the coordinating principle of forum conveniens for the exercise of Trans-Tasman jurisdiction. The analysis that follows assumes, however, that the court issuing an anti-suit injunction has first concluded that it is the forum conveniens by reference to the Spiliada standard and not, as in Australia at present, when merely concluding that is not a clearly inappropriate forum. 84 There are two considerations that suggest the need for the anti-suit injunction to assist the stay of proceedings so as to deal effectively with the potential for lis pendens in the Trans-Tasman regime. The first are the vague limitations on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia. From the time that Australian courts gained the power to transfer proceedings between them up until Wakim, an anti-suit injunction was issued only once: the Federal Court enjoining litigants not to pursue parallel proceedings in the South Australian Supreme Court. 85 A consequence of Wakim was the reactivation of jurisdictional contests between federal and state courts -contests that are addressed by anti-suit injunctions. In "accrued jurisdiction", which is the principal means by which the Federal Court can hear many, if not most, of the commercial disputes that come before it, there is ample opportunity for litigants to disagree on the court's right to hear the proceedings. As a result, there is an enhanced role for anti-suit injunctions from state courts that target commercial litigation which sits toward the extremities of the Federal Court's jurisdiction. There is also a role for Federal Court injunctions that protect its aspiration to deal with commercial disputes which centre on federal law. 86 There is every reason to suggest that this problem will also dog Trans-Tasman disputes. Without an anti-suit injunction to deal with it there remains a risk that the New Zealand High Court, in particular, and the Federal Court could each consider itself the forum conveniens, and be left without any means of terminating parallel proceedings before they came to judgment. This is a position the superior Australian courts do not suffer under the intra-Australian model, but that is only because they can use the anti-suit injunction.
The second consideration why, at present, the ban on anti-suit injunctions could present difficulties for the Trans-Tasman regime relates to the treatment of choice-of-court agreements. This would be less significant if the jurisdictional rules of the Choice of Court Convention were brought into the Trans-Tasman regime -an issue discussed below 87 -but there is no suggestion of this possibility under the Trans-Tasman Treaty. As it stands, forum selection under the regime treats a choice-of-court agreement as only one consideration to take into account in the search for the forum conveniens. Anti-suit injunctions have been important means of enforcing exclusive choice-of-court agreements when, in breach of contract, a party to the agreement litigates in a different court that does not itself decline jurisdiction. 88 On the face of the Trans-Tasman Treaty, the risk that its principles of jurisdiction will trump any party autonomy expressed in a choice-of-court agreement is less than is the case under the Brussels Regulation, where a court first seised of jurisdiction on some ground other than a choice-of-court agreement will be given priority. 89 But Australian courts, at present, are more likely to hold jurisdiction against the terms of an agreement choosing a foreign court than they are to enforce it. 90 It may be that the Trans-Tasman regime itself compels Australian courts to change this approach to choice-of-court agreements -or at least to agreements that select New Zealand courts. In general, Australian courts are much more inclined to enforce a derogating choice-of-court agreement in interstate litigation than they are in international cases, 91 and, as the purpose of the Trans-Tasman regime is effectively to bring New Zealand into the intra-Australian scheme of jurisdiction and judgments, that practice might well be extended to Trans-Tasman litigation. However, the treaty gives no assurance that the present Australian practice will change, and without that it seems that the anti-suit injunction could be needed to place litigation in the contractually chosen court. But, so far as the treatment of choice-of-court agreements is concerned, the adoption of the jurisdictional rules of the Choice of Court Convention in Trans-Tasman cases would be a more effective solution.
Even before Wakim, it was evident that the power to stay or transfer proceedings in Australia was insufficient to prevent parallel proceedings from arising in different courts. 92 It still remains preferable to align intra-Australian and TransTasman arrangements so that the ban on anti-suit injunctions is lifted, at the least, for the superior courts of both countries. This would only preserve the existing powers of the New Zealand High Court to restrain proceedings in Australia, and of Australian superior courts to restrain proceedings in New Zealand. Again, a high degree of co-operation between courts on either side of the Tasman can be expected, and the issue of an anti-suit injunction is likely to be rare. It should be even rarer if Australian practice in relation to choiceof-court agreements would show more respect for party autonomy. However, a problem that is harder to solve (because it requires constitutional change in Australia) is the contestable commercial jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Australian experience has been that this has revived the importance of the anti-suit injunction as a means of avoiding lis pendens, and it is hard to see why that, too, should not be available in Trans-Tasman litigation.
Fifthly, under the Australian scheme, there are no grounds to refuse registration of an interstate judgment. 93 It is the settled position in Australia that states are constitutionally prohibited from refusing to apply the law or judgment of another state on public policy grounds; 94 one reason why the circulation of judgments across the Australian federation is "absolutely free". In the Trans-Tasman regime, public policy is available as the sole ground for challenging the registration of a judgment from the other country. 95 This gives rise to two further issues. The first is why no express provision is made for the treatment of incompatible judgments of courts in the CER market area. The Australian scheme is silent on the point and, as the Service and Execution of Process Act is a code for the interstate enforcement of judgments, Australian courts have no statutory guidance as to how they should deal with an incompatible judgment from another state. The common law rule is that the court (with a recognised international jurisdiction) that rendered judgment first is the court that makes the issues in dispute res judicata, and subsequent judgments should give way to its judgment. 96 Unfortunately, the codification of interstate enforcement in Australia does not allow reference to the common law rule. When recommending the present scheme for the interstate enforcement of judgments, the Australian Law Reform Commission also thought that priority would be given to the judgment made first. 97 It remains unclear why, even if the likelihood of incompatible judgments is a small one, the commission then refused to recommend a statutory rule to that effect. That is the position that has been carried into the Trans-Tasman regime. The Working Group took the view that, as different courts coming to different judgments is a scenario that is most unlikely to happen, there is no need to legislate for incompatible judgments. 98 However, for any scheme that sorts litigation between courts exclusively by the exercise of their own discretion, and leaves them without anti-suit injunctions to restrain parallel proceedings brought to their attention, a simple statutory direction for the treatment of incompatible judgments would seem a worthwhile precaution.
The second further consideration returns us to the public policy ground for refusing recognition of a judgment made in the other country. It might be thought that this is only a formal, theoretical defence, and one that is practically unusable. Australian and New Zealand courts have never been reported as applying public policy as a ground for refusing to enforce a foreign civil judgment. 99 Indeed, in Bolton v Marine Services Ltd 100 Thomas J in the New Zealand High Court intimated that there was a public policy of deterring absconding debtors that gave competing reasons to prefer the recognition of foreign judgments. 101 The one role that the public policy ground for refusing to enforce a Trans-Tasman judgment might legitimately have is that it could allow the courts a backdoor means of introducing a rule for dealing with incompatible judgments -and probably the common law rule at that. 102 In more general and principled terms, however, the public policy defence appears to be one of those "safeguards required for interaction with more distant, dissimilar countries" that the Working Group thought unnecessary within Trans-Tasman arrangements. 103 It is arguably incompatible with the Trans-Tasman Treaty's recital of the two countries' "close historic, political and economic relationship", and each country's "confidence in the judicial and regulatory institutions of the other". 104 Furthermore, given the high degree of intergovernmental co-operation between Australia and New Zealand, it is extremely unlikely that judgments made in one country would be so contrary to the other's basic notions of justice as to offend its public policy. The two countries have already disallowed the public policy defence to the enforcement of each other's revenue judgments, 105 and it would be preferable that it be denied even more generally. 106
C. THE CONVENTION AND THE TRANS-TASMAN REGIME: A COMPARISON
Even though the legislation implementing the Trans-Tasman Treaty has yet to be finalised, 107 there is enough in the treaty to suggest that the basic institutions of the Trans-Tasman regime for jurisdiction and judgments will differ profoundly from those of the Choice of Court Convention.
Jurisdiction
The Choice of Court Convention regulates the jurisdiction of courts when businesses agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of a given country and, in its approach to jurisdiction, inherits the rule-based approach taken in the Preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, and the Brussels 106 The example given in the Discussion Paper is of an Australian court awarding damages for personal injuries against a New Zealander for an accident that occurred in New Zealand. The Working Group suggests that, if this were to be enforced by registration in New Zealand, it could be contrary to that country's public policy as it would be incompatible with the no-fault accident compensation scheme of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ): Discussion Paper, supra n 13, 16. This scenario is probably inspired by Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR 433, but today is extremely unlikely. First, if proceedings are brought relating to an accident in the other country, the Spiliada principles of forum conveniens that will govern the question of declining jurisdiction in both countries are most likely to see the litigation referred to a court in the place of the accident. Secondly, as they currently stand, Australian choice-of-law rules will not see the relevant Australian law relating to personal injuries apply to an accident that occurs in New Zealand: Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491. New Zealand law would be applied. Thirdly, even if this improbable legal situation did arise, there remains the question whether the incompatibility of an Australian award of damages for personal injuries (against a New Zealand defendant or insurer) with the compensation available under the New Zealand no-fault scheme is so offensive to New Zealand's ideas of basic justice as to fall within the public policy exception for the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
and Lugano Conventions on which the Preliminary draft drew. 108 The difference with the discretionary, common law approach of the proposed Trans-Tasman regime is therefore in the foundational assumptions of the Convention, and is likely to give rise to other differences in the conceptualising of exclusive choiceof-court agreements and the effect to be given to them. According to Article 3 of the Convention, a choice-of-court agreement is "exclusive" if, for deciding how disputes between the businesses will be determined, it designates the courts of a contracting state "to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts". 109 However, it deems the agreement to be exclusive "unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise". 110 In short, so long as the reference in a choice-of-court clause in a contract is to one contracting state and one only, it is an exclusive choice. While the language of a "presumption" of exclusiveness was carefully avoided in the Convention, 111 the result is in effect a presumed position. It is an exclusive choice unless evidence to the contrary can be mustered. Furthermore, and somewhat artificially, as the contracting states are often federal or multi-jurisdictional nations, an agreement to have disputes dealt with in the courts of, say, a named federal nation state (where no other nation state is mentioned) will itself be deemed exclusive. 112 The Convention therefore defines an exclusive choice-of-court agreement much more broadly than tends to be the case at common law. The common law draws a distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements, although commentators suggest that the distinction is more marked and of greater legal significance in Australia. 113 The choice of court must be understood as excluding the right of the parties to sue in any court except the one named in the agreement. 114 An exclusive choice-of-court agreement proceeds on the assumption that, if parties did choose to have disputes heard only in a given court (or the courts of a given country), it is a breach of contract to bring proceedings somewhere else. Accordingly, a contextual judgment is made of the language of the clause to assess whether the parties intended that, if one of them did sue somewhere else, this would amount to a breach of contract. 115 Different approaches to the identification of choice-of-court agreements as exclusive or non-exclusive have been taken by courts, including the making of a presumption in favour of exclusiveness. 116 However, Adrian Briggs has made a powerful argument that reasons can be given for presuming for and against both exclusiveness and non-exclusiveness, and so "attempts to short-circuit the analysis of what the parties actually agreed with presumptions about what they must rationally have wanted . . . are insecure and unreliable". 117 No presumption has replaced the basic common law position that it is ultimately a matter of construing the contract according to its particular terms, 118 and therefore of giving effect to the parties' proved intentions.
The different approaches of the Convention and the common law will inevitably lead to different characterisations of choice-of-court agreements. 119 For instance, in Atwood Oceanics Australia Pty Ltd v BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd 120 the agreement stated that "the parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Victoria". It mentioned nothing else about the jurisdiction of courts. Article 3 of the Convention would require a clause like this to be construed as an exclusive choice-of-court agreement, because there is nothing in the parties' agreement that provides otherwise. 121 Using common law principles, the Supreme Court of Western Australia nevertheless found that it was a non-exclusive choice-of-court agreement and that, as result, proceedings could be brought in Western Australia without being in breach of contract. 122 That would be a possible construction of the agreement for any Australian or New Zealand court to take at common law and, almost certainly, under the Trans-Tasman regime. But it would still be incompatible with the approach demanded under the Choice of Court Convention.
If the agreement stated only that the parties agree to "submit to the jurisdiction of any competent court in the Commonwealth of Australia", the Convention would also treat this as "exclusive" for its purposes. 123 Under normal common law principles, again, courts would have little choice but to construe this as non-exclusive, 124 as (not counting Australia's external territories) the parties effectively agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of courts in eight states and territories that apply eight different systems of contract law.
The second difference lies in the effect given to an exclusive choice-of-court agreement. This is the centrepiece of the Convention. Article 5 gives the chosen courts, if in a Convention country, the right to exercise jurisdiction. 125 They cannot exercise a discretion, on the ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, not to deal with the case. 126 Article 6 requires courts in any other Convention country not to exercise jurisdiction. In fact, other Convention country courts must suspend or dismiss proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement (as defined in the Convention). 127 This is the key point of distinction with the Trans-Tasman Treaty. The Convention embodies an unqualified insistence that, if businesses have promised to litigate only in a given place, they will be expected to honour that promise. 128 Particularly in Australia, the common law is nowhere near as exacting about the keeping of these promises.
The case-law reinforces that common law courts will potentially endorse a breach of contract by holding on to litigation brought before them in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement. This is more likely to be found in Australian decisions in international contractual disputes, as an Australian court remains at least influenced by the Voth obligation to refuse to stay or dismiss proceedings if it considers itself "not clearly inappropriate". 129 In Akai Pty Ltd v Pty Ltd v People's Insurance Co Ltd, 130 Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in the High Court of Australia reiterated that the NSW Supreme Court was not precluded from hearing proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement, although the breach might be a consideration that the court would take into account to decline the exercise of jurisdiction. 131 However, the Akai majority thought that, unless there were strong reasons not to enforce the choice-of-court agreement, the proceedings should normally be stayed or dismissed. 132 This brought some slippage from the earlier practice in Australia, when only strong evidence would have allowed proceedings to be brought contrary to an exclusive choice. 133 In a series of studies, Mary Keyes has established that Australian courts have progressively become more prepared to hold proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement.
In the first study, Dr Keyes noted that from 1991 to 2001 an Australian court held jurisdiction against the terms of a choice-of-court agreement in 46 per cent of all cases. 134 More recently, she has also found that since 2001 the court has held jurisdiction against the terms of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement in 89 per cent of cases. 135 Akai, decided mid-way through the first period, may well have accentuated the parochial leanings of Voth. The samples are relatively small, but in whatever way these surveys are read they reinforce that Australian courts would be forced to make a large change in attitude to international litigation if the Choice of Court Convention were implemented.
From a purely doctrinal perspective, the Spiliada principles give a better prospect of courts requiring the performance of choice-of-court agreements. Australian courts using the Spiliada principles in interstate litigation have recognised the possibility that the proceedings can be held by the court against the terms of a choice-of-court agreement, but more consistently than in international litigation have required the parties to be kept to their bargain. 136 In World Firefighters Games Brisbane v World Firefighters Games Western Australia Inc, 137 the parties agreed to arrange the staging of "The World Firefighters Games" in Queensland, but also to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Western Australian courts for any disputes under the contract. Proceedings under the contract were brought in the Supreme Court of Queensland, but a transfer to the Supreme Court of Western Australia was sought. Almost all connections of any significance in the case were with Queensland, which was actually, without more, the most appropriate forum for dealing with the dispute. However, the exclusive choice-of-court agreement was decisive in leading Philippides J to transfer the proceedings to Western Australia. The fact that the parties, while conscious of all of the connections that their arrangements had with Queensland, had nevertheless agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Western Australian courts made the agreement an even weightier factor in the decision to transfer. 138 As noted earlier, New Zealand courts already use the Spiliada principles in international litigation. There, choice-of-court agreements seem to be subsumed under the larger question of forum non conveniens. 139 The small number of reported cases involving the treatment of choice-of-court agreements in New Zealand cannot give reliable evidence of any trend. In recent years, New Zealand courts have stayed proceedings and so enforced an exclusive choice of the South African courts for dealing with them, 140 but have also retained jurisdiction against a choice of the Spanish courts. 141 In no country has the application of Spiliada principles to choice-of-court agreements seen courts abandon the enforcement of contractual promises to anywhere near the extent to which this has happened in Australia.
Although it has been argued that the granting and refusing of stays in Australia on the ground of choice-of-court agreements are not conditioned by principles of forum non conveniens, 142 the Trans-Tasman Treaty clearly has the effect of subordinating choice-of-court agreements to the broader search for the more appropriate court. 143 It is therefore more compatible with the present approach in New Zealand. A stay is to be granted in, say, an Australian court on the ground that a New Zealand court "is the more appropriate court to determine the proceedings". 144 Article 8(2) of the Treaty then provides that "the more appropriate court" is to be determined "having regard to . . . whether there is agreement between the parties to the proceeding about the court or place where proceedings should be heard". Accordingly, the effect is to bring the decision to enforce choice-of-court agreements under a Spiliada-like discretion to hold on to the proceedings or to let them go. Despite being more deferent to choice-of-court agreements than the Australian approach, the New Zealand approach still recognises that courts are allowed to dishonour them. 145 A decade ago, Richard Garnett argued that Australian courts had "been slow to recognise the importance" of choice-of-court agreements, and in allowing proceedings to be held against the terms of a choice-of-court agreement had undermined certainty in commercial contractual relations and had harmed commercial expectations. 146 The evidence suggests that, since then, they have become even slower, and have now reached a point of disregard for certainty of contract that is unknown in other developed countries. 147 The insistence in the Choice of Court Convention on the performance of exclusive choice-of-court agreements would be an important and valuable correction to this. The Trans-Tasman Working Group made recommendations that suggested -albeit vaguely -that where choice-of-court agreements figure in Trans-Tasman litiga-tion, "a court would be required to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court". 148 The Working Group then claimed that the "approach is consistent with the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements", 149 but was silent on the point as to whether the terms of the Convention were to be a legislated qualification to the general forum conveniens principle of its suggested Trans-Tasman regime. As it turned out, no attempt was made to incorporate the jurisdictional rules of the Convention into the Trans-Tasman Treaty. They remain at odds.
Judgments
A double convention is oriented towards litigants concentrating the contest between them in the court that first deals with the case, and reducing -or eliminating -the possibility of litigation in other places where the judgment is to be enforced. The judgment debtor's greater exposure to the judgment in countries where enforcement is sought therefore adds to incentives for it to engage properly in the initial proceedings. Consequently, successful double conventions (like the Brussels Regulation and the intra-Australian scheme) are typified by extensive litigation on jurisdictional questions and little, if any, on cross-border enforcement. In the case of the Australian model -which has clear, simple and unqualified rules for cross-border enforcement -there is not a single reported case on the question under the Act of 1992. 150 Under the Choice of Court Convention, the judgment can be refused recognition if the choice-of-court agreement is null and void in the place chosen for the litigation, or if one of the parties lacks capacity to make contracts in that place. 151 Convention country courts may also refuse recognition of judgments awarding punitive or exemplary damages. 152 From that point, the Choice of Court Convention departs from the usual structure of double conventions. It allows a Convention country to refuse recognition or enforcement of a judgment if there was a denial of procedural justice in the original court, 153 if the judgment was obtained by fraud, 154 if recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public policy, 155 or if the judgment is incompatible with a local judgment or an earlier foreign judgment that is also recognised in the place of enforcement. 156 These latter grounds for contesting enforcement parallel those that allow enforcement of a judgment to be resisted at common law, 157 or that enable regis-tration of a judgment under the imperial scheme of 1933 to be set aside. The existing legislation in Australia and New Zealand still allows registration of judgments to be set aside on the same grounds. 158 The Convention therefore brings only two possible improvements to the existing law in the Trans-Tasman area for the enforcement of judgments, but suggests a further improvement for the Trans-Tasman regime. First, formally at least, it retains the effect of a double convention by denying the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the court that rendered judgment. However, when compared with the existing law in Australia and New Zealand this is only a cosmetic difference. At common law and under the reciprocal enforcement of judgments legislation, the foreign court is taken to have a jurisdiction that is recognised in Australia and New Zealand if the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the original court. 159 A choice-of-court agreement, whether exclusive or non-exclusive, gives that submission. 160 So in the conditions in which the Convention is to apply, a judgment debtor would not have had an effective defence of lack of international jurisdiction under the existing law. Secondly, the Convention allows any non-money judgment to be enforced. This is not possible at common law; nor under statutes presently in force.
It is only to the extent that the Convention allows enforcement of non-money judgments that it would improve the conditions for enforcing foreign judgments in Australia and New Zealand. It does not therefore promise the improvements in efficiency for the circulation of judgments that the Trans-Tasman regime will, and is therefore not as effective as a double convention. The Trans-Tasman Treaty provides that public policy is to be the only possible defence to enforcement of an Australian or New Zealand judgment in the Trans-Tasman Judicial Area. 161 As I have suggested, this defence seems unnecessary unless it can be used as a means of dealing with incompatible judgments that emerge from Trans-Tasman litigation. Even with the public policy defence, however, the Trans-Tasman arrangements significantly elevate the incentives for litigants to participate in the original proceedings, and to avoid duplicating litigation in the place of enforcement. And so far as the possibility of incompatible judgments goes, an express legislative statement of how they should be addressed is preferable to a general public policy defence. 162 Article 9 of the Convention itself provides a suitable model for legislation dealing with incompatible judgments by allowing recognition or enforcement to be refused if: "f) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested State in a dispute between the same parties; or g) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another State between the same parties on the same cause of action, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the requested State."
The Convention therefore provides for the usual position that the first judgment made by a court with a recognised jurisdiction to render judgment has prioritya rule that is itself an incentive for parties to engage actively in litigation commenced properly in a Convention country. A similar rule in Trans-Tasman proceedings would therefore give courts an immediate response to any attempt to register an incompatible judgment in the CER market area. Even more importantly, it would enhance the incentives for parties not to pursue parallel litigation in the first place.
D. THE CONVENTION AND THE TREATY: GIVING-WAY
The failure of the Trans-Tasman Treaty to take up the Working Party's suggestion of incorporating the Choice of Court Convention's rules of jurisdiction means that, if the Convention is implemented, the opportunity to secure a seamless approach to choice-of-court agreements in Australian and New Zealand courts could well be lost. Potential conflicts between the Trans-Tasman regime and the Convention must therefore be contemplated. As mentioned, 163 the Convention was drafted with the recognition that there was potential for incompatibility with other double conventions on jurisdiction and judgments. It has therefore tried to deal with that by incorporating "give-way rules". 164 These are set out in Article 26, and deal with the Convention's relationship with treaties between Convention countries, 165 pre-existing treaties between Convention and non-Convention countries, 166 treaties for the enforcement of judgments between Convention countries, 167 treaties made by countries after they implement the Convention, 168 and Regional Economic Integration Organisations. 169 It would be expected that, if either of Australia or New Zealand ratifies and implements the Choice of Court Convention, the other is likely to as well. And the creation of a Trans-Tasman Judicial Area by bilateral treaty potentially gives rise to the application of two of the Convention's give-way rules.
Article 26 begins by providing that the Convention is to be interpreted "so far as possible to be compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States". 170 What will trigger a give-way rule in the Convention is incompatibility: an application of the two instruments that leads to different results. 171 While the situations that could give rise to a conflict with the Trans-Tasman regime cannot be exhaustively predicted in advance, the earlier analysis suggests that three points of conflict loom: a common law characterisation of a choice-of-court agreement as non-exclusive when the Convention has it as an exclusive choice; an Australian or New Zealand court keeping proceedings in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement; and a defence available under the Convention (say, an incompatible judgment) to a judgment debtor for resisting enforcement of a judgment which is not available to that person under the Trans-Tasman Treaty.
Conflicts of these kinds most likely attract the "first give-way rule" of Article 26(2). So long as both parties are resident in a Convention country and the other treaty applies to them, the application of the treaty will be preferred. The assumption is that all countries implicated in the litigation have an "interest" in the treaty if it involves their residents, and none is therefore concerned that the treaty will be given priority over the Convention. 172 The Trans-Tasman regime applies to proceedings when a party is served in Australia or New Zealand, 173 again reflecting the common law assumption that jurisdiction is grounded on a person's amenability to the Queen's writ. 174 Especially for corporations, 175 residence and presence within the national borders of the two countries will usually coincide and so, by the Convention's own rules, the Trans-Tasman regime will apply. However, if a foreign corporation, doing business in Australia or New Zealand but formed in a third Convention country, is served with process in Australia or New Zealand, Article 26(2) does not allow the Convention to give-way. 176 In their terms, both the Trans-Tasman Treaty and the Convention apply to this situation, but the Convention is to have priority. This would also be the rule for litigation over a multi-party contract between businesses from Australia, New Zealand and a third Convention state (say, the UK). In proceedings like this, the Convention's rules of jurisdiction would place the litigation in the court chosen by the businesses as set out in the contract made between them. It is really only in the unlikely case of proceedings between the Australian and New Zealand parties being conducted separately from any involving just one of them and the UK business that the different treatment of the one choice-of-court agreement could arise. Even here, courts might understandably be reluctant to characterise the one choice-of-court agreement (under the Convention) as exclusive so far as the proceedings involving the UK business were concerned, but non-exclusive (by common law principle) for the litigation just between the Australasian parties. A different characterisation nevertheless remains likely where the Convention's deeming of a choice as exclusive is patently artificial. 177 For instance, an agreement that stated that the parties submitted "to jurisdiction of any competent courts in the Commonwealth of Australia" -a choice that is not limited to one jurisdiction -is itself powerful evidence at common law for construing the choice of court as non-exclusive, where the Convention requires it to be treated as exclusive. 178 I reiterate that the risk of different characterisations under the Convention and the treaty in a case like this is small, and courts will usually do what they can to consolidate different proceedings brought under the one contract. However, splintered adjudication remains possible, and it is only the failure to take up the Trans-Tasman Working Group's recommendation to thread the Convention's rules of jurisdiction through the Trans-Tasman Treaty 179 that makes it possible.
The other give-way rule that could apply in Trans-Tasman proceedings relates only to the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Here, it could be envisaged that a judgment debtor might have a defence against enforcement of a judgment under the Convention that is not available under the Trans-Tasman regime. In short, if any of the defences available under the Convention other than refusing enforcement on the ground of public policy is arguable, the two regimes are in conflict. Article 26(4) ensures that the Convention gives-way to the treaty in this case, as its only requirement is that "the judgment shall not be recognised or enforced to a lesser extent than under this Convention". The Convention, admirably, sets itself as the floor for the conditions in which judgments will circulate, 180 and is prepared to improve enforcement by deferring to more efficient schemes for extending judgments. The refusal of the TransTasman regime to deal expressly with incompatible judgments is, nevertheless,
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Journal of Private International Law 239 one point where a conflict is possible. Under the Convention, the judgment must not be recognised in the place of enforcement if it is incompatible with a judgment made in the place of enforcement or with an earlier judgment made in another Convention country where jurisdiction was properly exercised. Under the Trans-Tasman regime, a literal reading of the treaty has an incompatible judgment entitled to registration and enforcement unless the rendering court concludes that registration would be contrary to public policy. Here, too, it would be better that the Trans-Tasman regime adopt the provisions of the Convention and expressly allow registration to be refused to a judgment that is incompatible with one given in the registering country or state, or with an earlier judgment made by any court in Australia or New Zealand with jurisdiction to do so.
E. CONCLUSION
The Choice of Court Convention is an important statement about the value to transnational trade and businesses of certainty in contractual relations. Its ultimate rationale might be to improve the extraterritorial extension of judgments, but in that respect, apart from introducing non-money judgments into the range of internationally enforceable orders, the Convention adds little to the existing law on the enforcement of judgments in Australia and New Zealand. 181 Rather, it is in its aim of removing any issue about jurisdiction in relation to exclusive choice-of-court agreements from efforts at enforcing judgments across borders that it would drastically improve the law in the Trans-Tasman area. Although New Zealand courts are also prepared to dishonour contracting parties' agreements about where to sue, the willingness of Australian courts to use the jurisdictional discretions they have invented since Voth and Akai to hollow out established principles of contractual certainty is breathtaking. The only evidence that is now available suggests that foreign interests wishing to invest in or trade with Australian businesses are best to expect that an Australian court will disregard any agreement they have deliberately made to litigate in another country. For Australian commercial law it is a juridically embarrassing and economically naïve position to be in. 182 It is counterproductive to the objectives of establishing certainty in international trading and commercial relationships and of respecting business expectations. Legislative correction is now the only practical possibility. The implementation of the Choice of Court Convention and the extension of its jurisdictional rules to the whole Trans-Tasman area are therefore opportunities that Australian and New Zealand Governments should seize.
A principled rationale for the Convention's rules of jurisdiction also suggests that they should be preferred for the more intimate arrangements being introduced for the CER market area, and for the intra-Australian model of jurisdiction as well. 183 In two respects, the example of the Convention can also correct some weakness brought into the Trans-Tasman regime from the Australian scheme for jurisdiction and judgments -the risk of lis pendens and incompatible judgments. At the front end of the regime, the effective deterrence or termination of parallel proceedings in a Trans-Tasman Judicial Area is only likely to be guaranteed if the superior courts of both countries retain the power to issue anti-suit injunctions. The practical need for that will nevertheless be reduced if the Convention's rules of jurisdiction are also adopted in TransTasman and intra-Australian cases. At the back end, the Convention's rules that state when the enforcement of incompatible judgments may be refused would bring worthwhile certainty to the terms on which judgments can circulate across borders in the market area. The alignment of the rules for sorting jurisdiction between all polities in the Trans-Tasman area with the provisions of the Convention is therefore both preferable policy and preferable practice. Some effort therefore needs to be taken to stitch Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention into the Trans-Tasman Treaty, as well as the terms of Article 9(f)-(g). 184 The inclusion of Articles 5 and 6 was the apparent recommendation of the Trans-Tasman Working Group, 185 and since both governments agreed to adopt the Working Group's recommendations it is unfortunate that they overlooked this recommendation when concluding the treaty. 186 Furthermore, a sensible alignment of jurisdictional practice suggests that, for intra-Australian disputes as well, similar efforts need to be taken to include the terms of Articles 5 and 6 and, in part, Article 9 in the statutes that provide for the interstate enforcement of judgments and for transfers of proceedings and stays within the federation on forum non conveniens grounds. 187 Indeed, it would seem that a stronger case can be made for August 2009 Journal of Private International Law 241 a categorical rule that requires proceedings to be dealt with in the contractually chosen court where each country and state undoubtedly enjoys more "confidence in the judicial and regulatory institutions of the other" 188 than is possible for the larger group that is presently ratifying the Choice of Court Convention.
